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Large changes in marital trends during the second half of the 20th century raise the question
of the reason leading to marriage in Western Europe and in Northern America: declining marriage
rates, increase in cohabitation, increasing divorce rates. But the reason to get married can be
diverse and can evolve over the life cycle. This paper examines is there is a demand for diﬀerent
marital contracts. In France, since 1999, two types of marital contracts are available: the marriage
and the civil union (pacs). This paper investigates the substitution between the two contracts, by
analyzing the distribution of the age at ﬁrst marriage by cohort. It detects some recent changes
in the bottom of the distribution of the age at ﬁrst marriage, indicating a small impact of pacs
on marriage. Therefore, it tends to conclude that substitution eﬀects are likely to be very small
and that the pacs reveals a demand for diﬀerent marital contracts.
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Societies in Western Europe and Northern America witnessed large changes in the household formation
during the second half of the 20th century: less marriages, decrease in crude marital rates, but also in
hazard rates, increasing divorce rates, cohabitation preceding marriage, and rising age at marriage.
These changes denote a change in the demand for marital contracts, that can be linked to economic
changes (education and labor supply of women) and to social norms (decrease in the stigma associated
to divorce). But the supply of marital contracts has also evolved: most countries have passed less
stringent divorce law, such as no-fault divorce, or unilateral divorce in the US. In many Western
Europe countries, the supply for marital contract has also been extended: the claim of same-sex
couples led to the creation of alternative marriage contracts, often called Civil Unions or Registered
Partnership. In most countries, however, this alternative contract is available for same-sex couples
only. But other countries, such as France, the Netherlands and Belgium, made it available to diﬀerent-
sex couples, creating a median way between cohabitation and marriage. The terms of Civil Unions
contracts are very diﬀerent from one country to the other, but a common feature is that they are
easier to break up than marriage.
In France, the pacs1 has been created in 1999. While political debates mostly focused on giving a
legal marital status to same sex couples, it has been opened to diﬀerent sex couples since its creation.
It is close to marriage, but easier to break up. The number of contracted pacs has been increasing
since 2000. In 2009, two pacs are contracted for three marriages. Despite its success, little is known
on the pacs: the lack of micro data makes it diﬃcult to know who are the pacsed partners, why they
contract a pacs and the link between pacs and marriage. Is there any substitution between the two
contracts? Or are they considered as diﬀerent contracts by couples?
The question of substitution between the two marital contracts address the issue of the use of
marital contracts: is there a demand for diﬀerent marital contracts? The economic theory of marriage
examines the utility of marriage respect to cohabitation, considering that the main diﬀerence between
the two contracts is that marriage is more costly to break up. The literature takes the opportunity
of the adoption of unilateral divorce to evaluate the impact of lowering the costs of separation on
marriage rates and investment in couple speciﬁc goods. The French case is even more interesting as it
is not a type of contracts that replace another one, but the creation of two distinct contracts, implying
horizontal diﬀerentiation in marital contracts. As a consequence, it proposes an original framework
to evaluate what changing marital institutions indicates on marital behavior of couples. Substitution
1pacs stands for Pacte Civil de Solidarité (Civil Pact of Solidarity). The word is now very common in French and
some derivative have been rapidly created: the verb "se pacser" (that I will translate in "to pacs" means "to contract









































1between pacs and marriage means that a contract facing lower costs of divorce is preferred. But if
the substitution is dynamic: it would mean that the demand for marital contracts changes over time.
This paper analyses the evolution of the marriage after the pacs is created. The goal of the paper
is to evaluate if some substitution between pacs and marriage can be detected. In that purpose, I try
to detect any change in the timing of marriage. I start with a period analysis that give how marriage
evolves after the creation of the pacs compared to the period before. Then, I show that the timing of
marriage can be summed up in the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the age at ﬁrst marriage
for each cohort. So I try to detect changes in features of the CDF. I do not pay attention to classical
features of the distribution such as mean and variance but to quantiles of the distribution. I try to
detect if the quantile function conditional on cohort is changing after the creation of the pacs.
The paper shows that if any, the impact of pacs on the timing of marriage is rather small. Quite
surprisingly, the pacs does not seem to aﬀect much the timing of marriage.
After presenting the main evolution of marriage and pacs in France in section 2, I make explicit
what could be the linked between pacsed and marriage in section 3. I analyse the evolution of marriage
and of the mean age at marriage in section 4, and proposed an evaluation of the introduction of the









































12 Marriage and pacs
2.1 Marriage: key historical changes
The second half of the 20th century witnesses large changes in the marriage law in France. It modiﬁed
the relationship between the spouses and the link between children and marital status of their parents.
The law evolved toward more equality between spouses. Since 1965, women can have a bank
account and get a job without their husband consent. Equality between spouses is enacted in 1970:
the father authority disappeared as the only authority in the household, it is replaced by parental
authority. The divorce law changed to facilitate the exit from marriage. The no-fault divorce is made
possible in 1975, but unilateral divorce is not permitted in France. Divorce procedure have been
simpliﬁed in 2005 when spouses agree on the division of assets.
In the same time, the notion of parenthood has been progressively removed from the marital
status. Since 1972, the law stipulates that acknowledged out-of-wedlock children have to be treated
equal to in-the-wedlock children in terms of inheritance. As a consequence, the marriage of the parents
of an out-of-wedlock child does not change anything in the eyes of the law. This equality has been
extended to acknowledged children born of adultery in 2001, that are now equal in all respects to
in-the-wedlock children. All diﬀerences between children according to the marital status of parents
have been removed. Vital statistics on marriage do not register if he spouses already have children
when they get married since 2005.
The consequence of these changes is that the marriage become a contract enacting the couple but
not the family links, that are now independent of the marital status of the parents2.
The evolution of the law came jointly with the evolution of the household formation: the number
of marriages is declining since the early 1970s (see ﬁg. 1), while the number of out-of-wedlock births
increased progressively. The number of out-of-wedlock births is greater than in-the-wedlock births
since 2006. Most unions start with a cohabitation period: Toulemon (1996) indicates that in 1994,
almost 90% of marriages started with a cohabitation period. As a consequence, the pacs has been
created whereas the society experienced large changes in the household formation and marriage is not
necessarily a stepping stone in the family formation.
2.2 The introduction of pacs: a competing contract?
The pacs was created in November 1999. It concludes 10 years of debates on the possibility to create
a marital contract for same sex couples, as Denmark did in 1989. But it mostly concludes two years
2The only remaining diﬀerence is that the father of a new born child is by default the husband when the mother is









































1of highly tense debates. The leading idea of the pacs was to provide a legal status to unmarried
couples, therefore including same sex couples. However, the political debates mostly focused on the
social consequences of providing same sex couples a legal form of union, that would entitle same sex
couples to legal recognition.
At the beginning, the pacs has been made on purpose diﬀerent from marriage (see tab. 1 for a
comparison of the contracts). Pacs and marriage are similar to a certain extent: both contracts target
couples: although the possibility to make the pacs available for relatives has been considered, it has
not been left in the ﬁnal text. Both ensure protection to partners: in case of death, the surviving
partner can not be booted out the common housing. The pacs is a contract made to help partner
"organizing their common life"3. As a consequence, pacsed partners are jointly responsible for debts
and the pacs ensured by default a joint property of assets, unless the contract has been modiﬁed when
it was signed. But the pacs was not created equal to marriage. Indeed, all couples can contract a pacs,
including same sex couples. Moreover, a pacs can be break up with mutual consent or unilaterally.
In those cases, a simple letter is enough to break up the union. A pacs is automatically broken up
if at least one partner get married or in case of death of one partner. Even if the divorce procedure
has been facilitated since 2005, it still requires at least an hearing with a judge (instead of two before
2005). Some institutional features distinguish the pacs from a marriage: it is a private contract and
not a public institution as marriage. So it is privately contracted at the court, and not publicly at the
town hall. The pacs is not considered as a stepping stone in the formation of a family: so it does not
entitle couples for joint adoption nor survival beneﬁt in case of death. It does not open the possibility
to ask for citizenship. In case of death, a pacsed partner is not necessarily the heir of the deceased
partner: a testament is needed and inheritance were taxed diﬀerently. While married couples could
join their income for income taxation since the date of marriage, pacsed couples had to wait for three
years before ﬁlling jointly one tax returns.
The pacs has been modiﬁed over time. In 2004, the interdiction to collect data on pacsed persons
was raised, denoting that the pacs got more recognized as more and more couples, including diﬀerent
sex couples opt for the pacs. In 2005, the three years delay for joint income taxation of pacsed couples
was suppressed. Leturcq (2011b) shows that it encouraged couples to contract a pacs. The largest
change occurred in 2006: the law was modiﬁed to clarify the right and duties of pacsed partners.
It also included a shift from joint to separate property of assets by default. In 2007, the taxation
on inheritance between married spouses or pacsed partners were modiﬁed and made similar (but a
testament is still required to designate the partner as the heir). So today, the main diﬀerences between
3Loi nř99 944 du 15 novembre 1999, Art. 515 1 "Un pacte civil de solidarité est un contrat conclu par deux personnes









































1the pacs and the marriage are the cost of separation, the possibility to adopt a child jointly, the lack
of survivor beneﬁt, the right to citizenship, and the pacs is still contracted in a court. Moreover, since
2007, the pacs is mentioned on birth certiﬁcates.
As denoted by Festy (2001), it was diﬃcult to assess the pacs during its ﬁrst years. It seemed to
be more popular than in the Netherlands, but the lack of data made it diﬃcult to understand the
reason of that relative success. But the number of pacs contracted kept increasing both for same sex
couples and diﬀerent sex couples (Carrasco, 2007). As the rate of increase is larger for diﬀerent sex
couples, the proportion of the same couples among pacsed couples decrease over time. 5% of pacsed
couples are same-sex couples in 2009, the proportion was 25% in 2000. Micro data on pacsed couples
are still not available. However, the analysis of data of a matched data set of tax returns and labour
force survey (Enquête revenus ﬁscaux) indicates that pacsed couples are more educated, have less
children than married patners (Davie, 2011).
To conclude, the distinction between marriage and cohabitation has been lowered over time. The
pacs was created as an intermediary contract between cohabitation and marriage. But it has been
modiﬁed and it is now closer to marriage. But it is still a diﬀerent contract, especially because of
lower costs of separation, which are considered in the economic literature as the corner stone of the
diﬀerence between cohabitation and marriage. It raises the question of the horizontal diﬀerentiation
of contracts and the substitutability of the two marital contracts.
The transition from pacs to marriage could not be studied using the data on dissolution of pacs
provided by the Ministry of Justice because transition from pacs to marriage were not observed before
2007.4
4When contracting a marriage, the pacs is automatically dissolved. So partners did not have to mentioned to the
court that they were not pacsed anymore after a marriage. Until 2007, vital statistics (birth certiﬁcate) were not
matched with data on pacsed partners. As a consequence, the dissolution following the marriage of one partner is
unknown for the Ministry of Justice. In 2007, vital statistics were matched to birth certiﬁcate mentioning marriage
and the data set on pacs dissolution has been updated: but all broken pacsed because of a marriage were attributed to
2007. As a consequence, the transition from pacs to marriage is not observed, and won’t be observed until some survey









































13 Links between marriage and pacs
3.1 Related literature: the economics of marital contracts
The economic literature on marriage has long ignored marital contracts. Since the seminal work by
Becker, the literature has focused on couples: the theory of marriage is either a theory of matching
(Becker, 1973, 1974) or a theory of household formation (Becker, 1981). But the development of
cohabitation and the increase in divorce rates raised new issues: for example, link between marital
instability and length of pre-marital cohabitation (Brien, Lillard, and Stern, 2006; Reinhold, 2010),
the cause of increasing divorce rate (impact of divorce laws: Wolfers (2006); Friedberg (1998)) and the
consequences on investment in capital speciﬁc goods, such as children (Stevenson, 2007; Drewianka,
2008).
The literature considers that couples can choose among two possibilities: cohabitation and mar-
riage. Marriage is consider as a more committing relationship because it is more costly to dis-
solve. Some studies have considered marriage and cohabitation in a static framework. They are
based on the theory of cooperative game and they insist on marriage as a commitment device
(Matouschek and Rasul, 2008; Cigno, 2009). The idea is that marriage induces cooperation by increas-
ing the cost of separation. Therefore, low quality couples use marriage in order to foster cooperation.
This idea concludes that marriage is used by low quality couples to enforce commitment.
But the link between marriage and cohabitation is complicated by dynamic. Static models fail
to explain the development of cohabitation preceding marriage. Nowadays, a period of cohabitation
tends to precede marriage (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). In Brien, Lillard, and Stern (2006) cohabi-
tation is explained by incomplete information about the quality of the match. Before marring, couples
try to ﬁnd out how good the match is. Therefore, it is a necessary step in the household formation as
partners discover new information about the quality of the match in a repeated game. The authors
link the length of the cohabitation duration to marital instability: the longer the cohabitation period,
the less clear the match quality is and the higher the probability of divorce after marriage. The
underlying idea is that imperfect information justiﬁes the two step dynamic of the formation of the
household. This idea echoes the seminal work by Mead (1970) proposing a two step marriage, i.e. a
marriage that includes a ﬁrst step as a trial for the couple.
In the model presented above, the marriage strengthens commitment between couples. But as
marriage is considered as a long term partnership between two spouses, it highlights the willingness
of the two partners to live together. As so, it can be considered as a signal toward to rest of the









































1one’s willingness to form a household (Matouschek and Rasul, 2008).
The models consider only two types of marital arrangement: cohabitation and marriage. However,
the supply of marital contracts changed during the period in many countries. The claim for legal
recognition by same sex couples led to the creation of diﬀerent marital contracts. In many European
countries, civil unions were created, although most of them are same-sex couples only. But some
countries made civil unions available to both diﬀerent sex and same sex couples (France, Netherlands
and Belgium). They are marital contracts, more of less diﬀerent from marriage (an interested reader
should refer to Waaldijk (2005)). A key common feature of civil unions is that there are easier
to break up than marriage, including the possibility of unilateral break up. In France, unilateral
divorce is not permitted but a pacs can be unilaterally broken up. As such, the shift between pacs
and marriage could be compared to the shift from no fault divorce to unilateral divorce in the US.
However, in countries where civil union is made available to diﬀerent sex couples, the new contract
does not replace the old one, and it comes in addition to the marriage contract. Therefore, it provides
a diversiﬁcation in the supply of marital contracts.
Excluded Drewianka (2004), the literature has not studied the impact of the diversiﬁcation of
marital contracts on marital behavior. The understanding of potential links between marriage and
pacs can be inspired by the literature on cohabitation and marriage. It can be understood as a
less committing contract than marriage as it is less costly to dissolve, or as a diﬀerent signal. But
introducing a new type of marital contract has an ambiguous impact on the quality of the signal.
Providing a kind of signal could improve the signalling of the couple, because it increases the supply of
signals. But the quality of a signal depends on a universal agreement on the meaning of the contract.
As it is a new contract, pacs can shape diﬀerent meanings for pacsed couples (Rault, 2009).
As a consequence, the analysis of the use of marriage, pacs and cohabitation requires ﬁrst to
understand better the substitutability between pacs and marriage. This could make clearer how close
the marital contracts are in the use of partners. At time t, for a couple: pacs can substitute to
marriage or to cohabitation. But the dynamic could be more complex: pacs could be a long term
substitute to marriage, keeping couples away from marriage and inducing foregone marriages, or it










































3.2.1 The potential links between marriage and pacs
The following analysis investigates the potential links between pacs and marriage, by comparing what
could be the behavior of couples if the pacs exists compared to how they would have behaved, the
pacs has not existed. I assume that the creation of pacs does not aﬀect the couple formation, so that
the number of couples is the same as what it would have been without the pacs.
If the pacs does not exist, couples can only cohabitate or be married. The creation of the pacs adds
a third possibility in the couples’ choices. As a consequence, at time t, it substitutes for cohabitation
or for marriage. If it is a perfect substitute to marriage, the number of marriage is lower than what it
would have been, but the number of unions is equal to what would have been the number of marriages.
If it it is a perfect substitute to cohabitation: the number of marriage is not aﬀected, and the number
of legal unions is greater than what it would have been without pacs. The intermediate case would
be that it is an unperfect substitute to both and the number of marriage is lower, but the number of
unions is greater than the counterfactual number of marriages. If the counterfactual was observed, ie
the number of marriage contracted at time t if the pacs has not been created, the substitution between
pacs and marriage would be easily checked out. The observation of the joint evolution of the number
of unions and marriage in ﬁg. 2 suggest that the pacs is an unperfect substitute to marriage, because
the total number of unions increases while the number of marriages decreases. But, the counterfactual
number of marriages is not observed, so it is unable to give the underlying link between pacs and
marriage.
The substitution between pacs and marriage indicates if they are close contracts for couples.
The utility derives from marriage is heterogenous in the population because of diﬀerent demographic
features (such as children) or diﬀerent match quality. If pacs is a substitute for marriage then it
aﬀects those couples deriving better level of utility from marriage than cohabiting couples. If it
is a substitute to cohabitation it aﬀects those deriving from marriage lower level of utility. As a
consequence, substitution to marriage indicates a low horizontal diﬀerentiation between contracts.
Utility derived from marriage can change over the life cycle (change in income, professional mo-
bility, children, imperfect information on the match quality as in Brien, Lillard, and Stern (2006)):
attitudes toward marriage and pacs can also changed over the life cycle. As a consequence, the links
between pacs and marriage have to be considered in a dynamic framework.
If the pacs does not exist, there are only two types of couples: only cohabiting couples (type 1









































1after a while (type 2 couples). But if the pacs is made available, four dynamics can be considered:
only cohabiting couples; cohabitation and then pacs; cohabitation, pacs and marriage or cohabitation
followed by marriage. The link between marriage and pacs depends on which type of couples alter
their behavior. If pacsed couples would have been only cohabiting couples (type 1), the impact of
pacs on marriage is very limited. It modiﬁes the number of marriage contracted if couples, once
pacsed, turn their mind toward marriage. Direct transition from cohabitation to marriage without
pacs for type 1 couples are unlikely as it would violate the independence toward irrelevant alternatives
assumption. On the contrary, if pacsed couples would have been type 2 couples, the links between
marriage and pacs are more complex. A couple would have experienced a cohabitation spell before
getting married can be aﬀected by the pacs. If the new dynamic becomes cohabitation and then pacs,
then the pacs can be considered as a long term substitute to marriage, inducing foregone marriage.
The number of marriages is lower than what it would have been without the pacs, but the total num-
ber of unions is the same as the number of would-be marriages. The dynamic could also include a
pacs spell between the cohabitation spell and the marriage spell. If the pacs replaces the cohabitation
spell, without aﬀecting the marriage date, then the pacs can be considered as a short term substitute
to cohabitation and it has no eﬀect on marriage. On the contrary, if it aﬀects the marriage spell, the
pacs induces a delay in marriage, with couples postponing their marriage. So it does not decrease the
number of marriages over the life cycle, but it increases the number of unions contracted during the
life cycle and it changes marriage rates over the life cycle.
The diﬀerent scenarii proposed above show that the observation of marital behavior indicates
how pacs and marriage are close substitute of not. Long term substitution to marriage indicates that
there is no horizontal diﬀerentiation between contracts and they are competing marital contracts. On
the contrary, short term substitution suggests that the utility derives from marital contracts evolves
over time and pacs and marriage are competing for some part of the life. The lack of substitution
points out that the horizontal diﬀerentiation between contracts is important.
From the discussion above, the substitution between pacs and marriage can be analyzed by a
measure of the age an individual get married (the tempo component) and a measure indicating if
individual eventually marry or not (the quantum component). Both indicators are features of the









































13.2.2 Period and cohort approach of tempo and quantum components
An important stream in the demographic literature attempts to disentangle in the observed decreas-
ing marriage rate what comes from an increasing proportion of the population remaining unmar-
ried their entire life and what comes from a part of population postponing marriage to older age
(Goldstein and Kenney, 2001). The quantum of marriage describes the number of ever married indi-
viduals and the tempo describes the age the marriage is contracted. The main issue in this stream of
the demographic literature is: how many times an individual is going to experience a certain event
(here: marriage) in her life? The cohort-based approach consists in observing the cohort during its
entire life-cycle and counting the number of unmarried individuals to characterize the quantum of
marriage. The problem is that this approach prevents from analyzing recent trends in marital be-
havior. The period-based approach is more popular as it permits the analysis of recent trends. The
quantum is measured by the total marriage rate.5 It is merely deﬁned as the proportion of marriages
that would be observed in a ﬁctitious cohort experiencing at all ages the age marriage rates observed
during the period. The problem is that this indicator is biased if individuals postpone their marriage.
A bunch of papers attempt to extend the adjustment proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998). The
adjustment is based on the observed evolution of the tempo of marriage, measured by the evolution
of the mean age at marriage.
The two approaches answer diﬀerent questions: the quantum of marriage for a given cohort is
measured at the end of the life and describes the life of a cohort, that experienced diﬀerent periods,
while the period approach measures the quantum for a ﬁctitious cohort and has to be read as an
indicator of the social environnement at a given period.
The measure of the impact of pacs on marriage decisions is prone to another problem: the observed
period is still a transition period. Three periods can be distinguished. Before the introduction of pacs,
no cohort is aﬀected by pacs. So the evolution of the number of marriage is explained by changes
in the age structure of population and changes in the rates of marriage at diﬀerent ages. During
the transition period, the pacs is introduced at time t, so it aﬀects diﬀerent cohorts at diﬀerent
ages. Therefore, some cohorts are aﬀected although part of the cohort is already married. Only the
unmarried couples from this cohort are aﬀected. But cohorts are not aﬀected at the same age, meaning
that the part of the cohort which is aﬀected is diﬀerent for each cohort. If there is some substitution
between marriage and pacs, the introduction of pacs modiﬁes the composition of unmarried couples
at age a for a cohort attaining the age of a after the pacs is created compare to a cohort attaining the










































1same age before the pacs is created. After the transition period, all cohorts experienced the choice
between pacs, cohabitation and marriage at all ages of their marital life. The 2000-2009 period is
clearly a transition period, as the marital life cycle varies according to the deﬁnition between 18 and
50 or 18 and 60. As a consequence, the transition period challenges the quantum analysis. Indeed,
period-based indicators relies on the extrapolation of old cohorts behavior on young cohort behavior,
assuming that tempo changes are independent on cohorts. This statement can not be assessed since
changes can follow the introduction of pacs. The change of the composition of the population also
challenges the interpretation of period-based indicators of the tempo of marriage such as the mean
age at marriage.
A cohort based approach seems more relevant. But, neither a cohort-based indicator of the
quantum nor the mean age at marriage can be measured during the transition period, as the end
of the marital life cycle is not observed for cohorts that started their marital life cycle after the
introduction of pacs.
However, the cohort based analysis of the tempo of marriage is made possible using quantiles, as
they feature the distribution of the age at marriage. The lowest quantile of the distribution of the
age at ﬁrst marriage are deﬁned for recent cohorts. As a consequence, tempo changes can be detected









































14 Period analysis: marriage trends
4.1 Data
Data on marriages come from Vital Statistics. It provides information on all marriages registered
in France since 1965: birth date of the spouses, marriage date, and some personal information such
as matrimonial status. Data on population come from the census. Census data are collected almost
every 7 years in France (1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006)6. Census provide information of people
according to the marital status, the age, the sex and diploma.
These data are the best to reconstruct cohorts, because they allow for the reconstruction of precise
outﬂows of singles in the marriage at all ages, contrary to survey data. Therefore, they provide precise
information on the quantiles of the distribution of the age at marriage.
The reconstruction of the outﬂows into marriage by cohorts requires some assumptions. Indeed,
people face competing risks: they can die or move abroad before getting married in which case the
marriage is not observed, and foreigners can move in France. Their marriage is observed if they marry
in France but not otherwise. In order to construct the hazard rate of marriage, I need the at-risk of
marriage population, i.e. singles. The survival of singles for a cohort is reconstructed across time by
removing married individuals to the stock of singles observed at the beginning of the period thanks
to census data. The diﬀerence between the reconstruction of remaining singles and the number of
singles observed in the next wave of the census is explained by movers and deaths. I drop the diﬀerence
uniformly from the number of singles reconstructed for each year between two waves of census.
Moreover, the marriage can be a repeated event over the life cycle. If the risk of remarriage
increases, the distribution of the age at marriage can not be compared across cohorts. This is easily
removed by considering only ﬁrst marriages. The age at marriage is the age attained in the year.
4.2 The long run evolution of marriage
The long run evolution of marriage presented in ﬁg. 1 shows that marital trends change dramatically
before the creation of pacs in 2000. The number of marriages increased in the late 60s before decreasing
in the 1970s until the mid 1980s. It is still decreasing since then but at a lower rate. The number
of marriages contracted per year is decreasing since 2000. However, the total number of unions
outnumbers the marriages. In 2009, the total number of unions is close to the highest level of
marriages in 1968. As a consequence, it seems rather impossible that the pacs is a perfect substitute
6Since 2004, census is made continuously: 8% of the population is listed each year. 2006 stands for listed people










































1to marriage as the observed pattern of unions would have required a large increase in the marriage
rates.
The level of the number of marriages can be explained by marriage rates and by the age structure
of population. The structure by age of the population has changed over time (see ﬁg. 3), and it could
change the number of marriages as the marriage rates are not constant over ages. In order to detect
if the changes are mostly explained by rates or population, I propose to decompose the evolution of
marriages in a part explained by the evolution of the population compared to a reference date t0 and
a part resulting in the change in the marriage rates:














where M(t) is the number of marriage at date t, Rt(a) the rate of marriage at age a at date t,
Pt(a) the population aged a at date t. The decomposition presented in ﬁg.4 shows that the evolution
of marriages mostly comes from the evolution of rates, although the number of marriages would have
been lower if the population has not kept increasing over the period. During the mid 1990s, baby
boomers leave the age of high marriage rates, inducing a decline in the evolution of marriages. After
2000, the decline in the number of contracted marriages is explained by marriage rates.
The hazard rates of marriage, deﬁned as the number of marriage for 1000 individuals in ﬁg. 5
give a rather diﬀerent picture. After the large decrease in the 1970s and in the 1980s, it becomes very
stable. The probability of contracting a union when single increases a lot after the introduction of
the pacs, while the probability to contract a marriage when single is stable.
4.3 Period indicators: Marriage rates and mean age
Total marriage rate The total marriage rate a year t gives the proportion of married people of
a ﬁctitious cohort at the end of the life, if it has at each age the marriage rate observed for this age
during the year t7. Although it is often considered as a measure of the quantum of marriage, it is
not adapted to measure the quantum of marriage in transition periods, as it tends to underestimate
the quantum for real cohorts if couples delay their marriage. As a consequence, the decrease of the















































1unadjusted TMR is the result of the decrease in the number of marriage and the increase in the
delay of marriage. Fig.6 shows that it tends to decrease dramatically until the late 1980s and remain
stable after. Partial TMR at speciﬁc ages can be computed. Instead of integrated over the life cycle,
partial TMR are computed on a certain age range. The sum of partial TMR is equal to the TMR.
Partial TMRs give a better insight of the evolution of marriage. The partial TMR are given in ﬁg. 7.
The large decline of the TMR in 1965-1986 is explained by the large decline of marriage before 24 for
women and men, but also by the decline of marriage rates between 24-29 for men. Although the TMR
seems stable after 1986, the stability is explained by a two-fold dynamic. Between 1986 and 2000,
the marriage rates of women aged 24-39 and men aged 30-39 increased, compensating the decline of
marriage rates of youths. After 2000, the marriage rates of women aged 24-29 starts declining, while
it keeps declining for men aged 24-29 years old, but the slope is steeper. The marriage rates at 30-39
stop increasing and become stable after 2000. Marriage rates after 40 years old keep increasing and
is not negligible for men, although it is very low for women. As a consequence, the two main changes
after 2000 are aﬀecting 25-39 years old individuals.
The age at ﬁrst marriage: why does it increase? The mean age at ﬁrst marriage increased
gradually since 1971 (ﬁg 8). It can not be directly read as the sign that the couples delay their marriage
because it is driven by two forces: the age structure of the population and the marriage rates at each
age. It can be decomposed into the part explained by the population and the part explained by rates.
Denoting Pt(a) the population aged a at t, Rt(a) the marriage rate of the population aged a at t
(Rt(a) = Mt(a)/Pt(a)), Pt =
 
a Pt(a) the total population at t and Rt the marriage rate at t (at all
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=nt(a)
Rt(a)
Rt       
=rt(a)
a
As a consequence, the evolution of the mean age at ﬁrst marriage can be written as:
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The left part (Sr) of the equation gives how would have evolved the mean age at ﬁrst marriage,









































1the evolution of the structure of the population. In the following, I group ages into 4 age groups.
Fig. 9 decomposes the evolution of the age at ﬁrst marriage in Sr and Sn. It shows that while the
evolution of rates explains the shape of the evolution of the age at ﬁrst marriage, the age structure of
the population has compensated the decline in the age at ﬁrst marriage that would have been more
than 2 years lower for men in the early 70s. Since 1995, the mean age at ﬁrst marriage would have
increased more without the decline explained by the age structure of the population.
Fig. 10 decomposes the impact of rates and population on age at ﬁrst marriage by age groups.
The decrease in the age at ﬁrst marriage before 1970 is explained by the increase of the number
of young people less than 24. The increase in the age at ﬁrst marriage due to changes in the age
structure of population between 1970 and 1995 is mostly explained by the increase in the population
aged 24-29 years old. It corresponds to the baby-boom cohorts. After 1980, the increase in the age
of marriage is explained by the changes in the rates of marriage of older people aged 24-39 years
old. The joint evolution of the number of 24-29 and 30-39 years old people and their marriage rates
explains the increase in the age at ﬁrst marriage.
There is no major disruption after 2000 in the evolution of the mean age at marriage. It is
interesting to notice that the age of pacsed partners (diﬀerent sex)8 are similar to the age at ﬁrst
marriage, and are evolving the same way between 2001 and 2006. Today, the age at pacs is even
greater. It could be linked to what was observed on TMR: the partial TMRs of persons aged 25-39
tend to decrease are become stable, indicating that there might be some substitution between pacs
and marriage at these ages.
8Data of the age of pacsed partner come from Carrasco (2007) for 1999 2006. 2007 2009 is reconstructed using data
of the mean age of diﬀerent sex pacsed partners provided by the ministry of justice under the assumption that the









































15 Delayed marriages? A cohort analysis
5.1 Detect delaying and foregone marriages: a quantile approach
As explained above, if the pacs aﬀects the marriage decision, the pacs can be seen as either a long
term substitute or a short term substitute to marriage.
If it is a long term substitute, it induces foregone marriages, meaning that part of the population is
not going to get married during their life: the proportion of unmarried individuals at the end of their
life time is greater than what it would have been the pacs has not been created. As it is measured at
the end of the life (or at an high enough age to consider that it is very unlikely that the remaining
unmarried part of the population is going to marry), it is deﬁned at the cohort level.
If pacs is a short term substitute to marriage, it induces that some couples delay their marriage
because they decide to pacs ﬁrst. It means that compared to another cohort, the probability to get
married is lower at some ages but it increases afterward. At the end of the life, the proportion of
unmarried individuals is the same for both cohorts.
As a consequence, delaying and foregone marriages can be detected analyzing the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of age at marriage for a cohort compared to its counterfactual. As for
duration models, the basic assumption is that everybody is getting married at the end, but some are
getting married very late, so the marriage is not observed because data are censored (either because
of death or because end of the period of observation). A foregone marriage can be seen as a censored
duration or as a delayed marriage after the death. So it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to estimate the
part of foregone marriage up to a certain age. Before this age, a foregone marriages is diﬃcult to
distinguish from a delayed marriage.
The analysis of delaying marriage is based on the deﬁnition of the quantile function, conditional
on the cohort. Let’s consider two cohorts. The CDF of the age at marriage is F0 for the older cohort
and F1 for the younger. The conditional quantile function deﬁnes delayed and foregone marriages:
1. Let’s deﬁne a foregone marriage an unmarried individual at age a. It means that Fk(a) = τk  = 1.
If there are more foregone marriages for the younger cohort, it is detected by τ1 < τ0. So, the
existence of foregone marriages means that quantiles q(τ) for τ greater than τk are not deﬁned.
However, this measure requires the observation of the cohort at least up to the age a.
2. Delayed marriages means that the younger cohorts marry later. Delaying at all ages means
that F1 is stochastic dominated by F0. A pure delaying does not induce foregone marriages, so










































13. If the delay is homogenous in the population, ie the delay for couples getting married young
is the same as the delay for couples marrying late (q1(τ) − q0(τ) = δ,∀τ), then this could
be express a a location shift of the CDF. But if the delay is heterogenous in the population
(q1(τ) − q0(τ) = δ(τ)), aﬀecting only early marriage for example, then it could also be linked
to a scale shift of the CDF.
The eﬀect of cohort on the quantile is the quantile treatment eﬀect (QTE) and it is measured by
the distance q1(τ) − q0(τ). As a consequence, an impact of pacs on the number of marriages and the
timing of marriages could be detected with the evolution of quantiles by cohorts, as long as previous
cohorts provide a good counterfactual to younger cohorts.
5.2 A cohort based approach
5.2.1 Reconstructing cohort
The analysis of the evolution of quantiles across cohorts requires the reconstruction of the cumulative
distribution function of the age at marriage by cohort. A cohort is composed of all individuals born
the same year, and the CDF gives how the cohort ﬂow out to married status. As a consequence, I
only consider the age at ﬁrst marriage.
It is not possible to observe the age at ﬁrst marriage for the whole cohort because individuals face
competing risks: death and out-migration, that can occurs before marriage. As a consequence, the
size of the observable at-risk population changes over time. Moreover, the size of the cohort is also
modiﬁed by in-migration. In order to analyse the CDF of the age at ﬁrst marriage, I need to ﬁx the
size of the cohort, contrary to the period analysis presented above. The following describes how I ﬁx
it.
The mis-speciﬁcation of the cohort can leads to under/over estimate the ﬂow in marriage. If the
reference size is the size at the beginning of the marital life9, then those who die before being married
are denoting as unmarried at the end of the life. So it would lead to overestimate the number of
foregone marriages, especially if the probability of dying tend to be bigger for ages such as the older
cohorts are already married but not the younger cohorts. More over, this is also a problem as it
increases the quantile at a given τ. But if the reference size of the cohort is the last observation for
the size of the cohort, because dying married individual are counted in ﬂow in marriage but not in
9The minimal age to get married without the consent of the parents is 18 years old in France for both men and
women since 1974. However, between 1974 and 2006, women could get married if they were between 15 and 18 years
old with the consent of parents. It has been increased to 18 for women in 2006. Before 1974, the minimal age to get
married without the consent of the parents was 21 years old for both men and women (since 1907), but women could










































1the cohort size. This would tend to underestimate the size of the cohort, and it could lead to a CDF
greater than 1, which is obviously not a desired property.
So I consider that the cohort is composed of singles at the end of the period I observe (age in 2009
or 60 years old) and individual getting married during the period I observe. As a consequence, singles
dying before marriage are not counted in the cohort size. When I do not observe the beginning of
the marital life (i.e. cohorts before 1950 for women and before 1947 for men) the cohort size is given
by the number of singles at the end of the period, added to those getting married during the period
and to those that are married at the beginning of the period I observe. So individuals dying before
getting married during the period and individual already dead before the beginning of the period of
observation (married of not) are not counted in the cohort size. As a consequence, the cohort size
is given by a restrictive deﬁnition of cohort, including the risk of death. In other words, data on
marriage are not censored, except by the end of the period of observation.
The in-migration ﬂows increase the cohort size, making it diﬃcult to deﬁne a cohort including mi-
gration. As a consequence, I only consider the age at ﬁrst marriage for French citizen. The citizenship
is deﬁned as the citizenship at the age of marriage, observed in the vital statistics. Naturalization
could modify the size of the cohort. If naturalization occurs before marriage then the individuals is
part of the cohort. The size of the reconstructed cohort is given in ﬁg. 11.
The problem raised by migrations prevents from analyzing the evolution of cohorts at a more
precise geographic scale because the cohort size is more variable.
For the precise determination of quantile, an individual is said to be married at age X if she was
over this age (in month) when marrying.
5.2.2 The evolution of marriage by cohort
The evolution of marriage rates is described by the density function (type 1 rate), the cumulative
function and the hazard function (type 2 rates).
The evolution of marriage rates by cohort can be divided into 5 periods. The evolution is similar
for men and women, although I keep diﬀerent cohorts as turning points for men and women to
illustrate this evolution, as men tend to marry older than women. The main evolutions are presented
on ﬁgures 12 for men and 13 for women.
For the cohorts born before 1951 (for men) and 1954 (for women), the marriage rate by age is
stable: the density and the cumulative function are almost the same. Men and women tend to marry
young: the density reaches a maximum at 22 for men and 20 for women: more than 30% of the cohort









































1are married. At 28, 76% of men born in 1945 are married. However, the hazard rate starts declining
after 23 for men and 20 for women, indicating that remaining singles tend to marry less.
The marriage rates at early ages (before 26 for men and 24 for women) decline sharply for cohorts
born in 1951-1962 and 1954-1963 for women. It increases for older ages, but not enough to compensate
the decline: 17% of women born in 1963 are married at 20 years old, and 48% of them are married
at 25 years old and 70% at 35, while 89% of the 1948 cohort was already married at 35. 15% of men
born in 1961 are married at 22, 48% are married at 28 years old and 64% at 35, it was 85% of the
cohort born in 1945. This decline is linked to a large decrease in the hazard rate up to 32 for men and
28 for women. The hazard rate does not get greater for younger cohorts at older ages. It means that
remaining singles never tend to increase their marriage rate compared to older cohorts. Despite the
large decrease, the marriage rates remain the highest at 19-20 years old for women, 22-23 for men.
The following period witnesses a shift in the marriage rates by age. While marriage rates keep
declining before 26 for men and 24 for women, they keep increasing after, inducing a shift in the age
the marriage rate is the highest. For men born in 1968, the marriage rate is the highest at 26 and for
women born in 1971, the marriage rate is the highest at 25 years old. However, the increase at older
ages does not compensate the decrease at younger ages: 58% of women born in 1971 are married the
year they turn 35, 53% of men born in 1968 are married at 35. The hazard rate keeps declining until
29 for men and 26 for women. Then it remains stable across periods: the hazard rate of marriage for
younger cohort never exceed the hazard rate for older cohort, whatever the age.
The marriage rates for women born between 1971 and 1975 are stable, while the marriage rate
for men born in 1968-1976 keeps decreasing and shifting: the marriage rate is the highest at 27-28.
The marriage rates starts decreasing again for women born after 1975 and men born after 1976. 6%
of men and 14% of women born in 1983 are married at 25.
In addition to the shift in the mean age at marriage, the variance of the rates of marriage has
increased a lot. For cohorts born in the 1940’s, the sharpness of the density of marriage rates traduces
the weight of social norms around marital habits. The decline of marriage rates has also diluted the
age considered as normal to get married.
To conclude, two main evolutions has to be taken into account: the transition starts with an
increase in the variance of the age at ﬁrst marriage. It is followed by a shift in the mean age at ﬁrst
marriage. The variance keeps increasing for recent cohorts. The following analysis attempts to see if










































5.3.1 Deﬁning the treatment
Estimating the impact of pacs on marriage requires the deﬁnition of treated units. The intuitive
deﬁnition considers that an individual is treated if she is not married when the pacs is created. Thus,
for a given cohort, some individuals are treated and some are not, depending if they are married
when the pacs is created. Therefore, if the pacs is created when τ*100% of the population is treated,
the determination of the ﬁrst quantiles up to q(τ) are not aﬀected by the pacs, because they are
determined before the pacs is created. But higher quantiles are likely to be aﬀected by the creation of
the pacs. Therefore, a cohort is considered untreated for the ﬁrst quantiles of the distribution up to
q(τ) and treated for quantiles larger than q(τ). Denoting C the cohort and t the date of the creation
of the pacs, FC(t−Ci) gives the number of married individual among the cohort C at the age t−C,
when the pacs is created. So the treatment status is given by
Ti(τ) = 1{FC(t − Ci) < τ} (1)
Fig. 14 illustrates the deﬁnition of the treatment status. As a consequence, a cohort can be
untreated for the determination of a quantile but treated for the determination of another quantile.
Treated and untreated cohorts for diﬀerent quantiles are detailed in table 3 for men and table 2 for
women.
Notice that the composition of the unmarried population at a rank τ depends on when the cohort
starts being treated. Indeed, let’s consider two cohorts: the pacs is created when the cohort C0
attains the rank in the distribution τ0 and when the cohort C1 attains the rank in the distribution τ1
with τ1 < τ0 (the cohort 1 is younger). So, if there is some substitution between pacs and marriage,
the composition of the unmarried population is diﬀerent when the two cohorts attain the rank τ,
because some individuals in cohort C0 got married between the age q(τ1) and q(τ0) but they would
not have been married if the pacs has existed at that time. It means that the treatment eﬀect at a
given quantile is not likely to be constant across cohorts, because it aﬀects diﬀerent populations.
5.3.2 A quantile regression approach: identiﬁcation issues
A before-after estimation on quantiles









































1Qai(τ|Ci) = α(τ) + δCi(τ) + ηCi(τ)Ti(τ) (2)
where ai is the age at ﬁrst marriage, Ci is the cohort of individual i and Ti indicates if the cohort
has been treated for this quantile as given in eq. 1, δCi(τ) is the cohort eﬀect for this quantile.
ηCi(τ) is the quantile treatment eﬀect at rank τ, for a cohort Ci. This framework does not give any
functional form for the eﬀect of the cohort on the quantile and for the eﬀect of the treatment on the
quantile. However, this framework meets the standard identiﬁcation problem that a cohort can not
be observed both treated and untreated for a quantile, preventing the identiﬁcation of δCi(τ) and
ηCi(τ) 10.
A simple diﬀerence identiﬁes ηCi(τ) if δCi(τ) is constant across cohorts. But δCi(τ) = δ(τ),∀Ci
imposes some stability on the repartition of the ages at ﬁrst marriages because it imposes that the
age such as τ ∗ 100% of the cohort is already married is constant across cohorts. It seems to be a
strong assumption, except for cohorts born during the 1940’s.
A standard diﬀerence in diﬀerence identiﬁes the impact of treatment under restrictive assumptions.
Consider 3 cohorts, C = 0, C = 1 and C = 2. Only the last cohort, C = 2 is treated at rank τ. The
diﬀerence in diﬀerence on quantiles identiﬁes (with a simpliﬁed writing):
[Q(τ|C = 2) − Q(τ|C = 1)] − [Q(τ|C = 1) − Q(τ|C = 0)]
= [δC=2(τ) + ηC=2(τ) − δC=1(τ)] − [δC=1(τ) − δC=0(τ)]
= ηC=2(τ) if [δC=2(τ) − δC=1(τ)] = [δC=1(τ) − δC=0(τ)]
The identifying assumption [δC=2(τ)−δC=1(τ)] = [δC=1(τ)−δC=0(τ)] is true if δC(τ) = δ(τ) ∗C
ie if the evolution of the quantile follows a linear trend. This assumption is strong as it assumes that
the evolution of the quantile between C = 1 and C = 0 describes well the evolution between C = 2
and C = 1. It does not allow non linear evolution of quantiles such as a period of stability of the age
at marriage following a shift. Under this assumption, the estimator is a simple before-after estimator,
ﬁgure 15 sums up the identiﬁcation of the quantile treatment eﬀect in that case.
Despite its simplicity, the analysis of non parametric quantiles in ﬁgure 17 for men and ﬁgure 19
for women shows that the linear trend assumption is not a bad approximation for cohort born after
1960 for low (τ ∈ [5,25]) and medium (τ ∈ [30,50]) quantiles, and for cohort born after 1955 for
10The CQF can be written using the classic Rubin framework: Qai(τ|C) = Q
(1)
ai (τ|Ci)Ti + Q
(0)
ai (τ|Ci)(1 − Ti) with
Q
(0)
ai (τ|Ci) = α(τ) + δCi(τ) and Q
(1)









































1higher quantiles (τ ∈ [55,75]).
Notice that the quantile treatment eﬀect ηCi(τ) is not necessarily constant across cohorts. An
important problem is that if there is substitution between pacs and marriage, the introduction of
pacs changes the composition of the unmarried population at a given age. So, the longer the period
between the introduction of pacs and the age the cohort attains when τ ∗100% is married is, the more
aﬀected the cohort is. I take this possibility into account including a trend for treated units.
The estimated equation is
Qai(τ|Ci) = α(τ) + δ(τ)Ci + [η0(τ) + η1(τ)Ci]Ti(τ) ≡ z′
iβ(τ) (3)
where Ti is a dummy indicating if the individual belongs to a treated cohort and Ci is a contin-
uous variable for the cohort. The vector of parameters β(τ) is estimated using quantile regressions.











τ × u, for u ≥ 0
(1 − τ) × u, for u < 0
The variance of the conditional quantile Qai(τ|Ci) is given by V (qτ) =
τ(1−τ)
f2(qτ) where f is the
density of the outcome (at). The estimation of the variance requires the non parametric estimation
of the density function f. In order to avoid such estimation, the standard errors of the coeﬃcients
are estimated by bootstrap.
The CQF is censored as the quantile is not necessarily deﬁned for youngest cohorts. The last de-
ﬁned quantile for each cohort is indicated in table 3 for men and 2 for women. I estimate the impact
of treatment on uncensored quantiles, so the composition of cohorts used for the estimation changes
depending on the quantile. An estimation including censored quantiles would be a nice extension.
Any change in the trend of the CQF after the pacs is created is going to be interpreted as a
treatment eﬀect. But it could also be explained by a break in the trend if a change is occurring at the
same time of the introduction of pacs. So it is diﬃcult to have a causal interpretation of the results,









































1Moreover, the quantile treatment eﬀect (QTE) is not identiﬁed if cohort ﬁxed eﬀect are integrated
in the model. But interquantile regressions can provide an estimation of the QTE when cohort ﬁxed
eﬀects are included.
A DiD model using interquantile distances
Let’s consider the most general model for the conditional quantile function, as given by the eq. 2:
Qai(τ|Ci) = α(τ) + δCi(τ) + ηCi(τ)Ti(τ)
The evolution of the CQF could be due to some cohort ﬁxed eﬀects across quantiles. It could be
included in the cohort eﬀect, written as a part depending on τ and a ﬁxed part:
δCi(τ) = γCi(τ) + µCi
The before-after estimation presented above does not identify the treatment eﬀect ηCi(τ) if cohort
ﬁxed eﬀects are included, even if the impact of cohort on quantile is linear with γCi(τ) = γ(τ)Ci.
Indeed:
[Q(τ|C = 2) − Q(τ|C = 1)] − [Q(τ|C = 1) − Q(τ|C = 0)]
= [γ(τ) ∗ 2 + µ2 + ηC=2(τ) − γ(τ) − µ1] − [γ(τ) + µ1 − µ0]
= ηC=2(τ) + [µ2 − 2µ1 + µ0]
Including cohort ﬁxed eﬀects is important if some large changes are aﬀecting all individuals of a
cohort and modifying their behavior towards marriage, in a sense which is not taken into account
by the linearity of the CQF in the cohort. Such changes could be a rise in education attainment, a
change in the minimal required age to get married. However, a cohort ﬁxed eﬀect aﬀect equally all
quantiles, inducing a location shift of the conditional cumulative distribution function. Most large
changes are not likely to aﬀect all quantiles the same way, but could aﬀect part of the distribution.
The identiﬁcation strategy presented below is based on pair wise comparison of quantiles, so it enables
to drop cohort ﬁxed eﬀects that are common to the two quantiles and thus allowing for ﬁxed eﬀect
for part of the distribution. If cohort ﬁxed eﬀects are assumed to aﬀect locally the distribution, a
comparison of close quantiles is suﬃsant to drop the cohort ﬁxed eﬀects.









































1quantiles deﬁned at τ0 and τ1, with τ1 > τ0. The interquantile distance is given by:
Qai(τ1|Ci) − Qai(τ0|Ci) = [α(τ1) + γCi(τ1) + µCi + ηCi(τ1)Ti(τ1)]
−[α(τ0) + γCi(τ0) + µCi + ηCi(τ0)Ti(τ0)]
= [α(τ1) − α(τ0)] + [γCi(τ1) − γCi(τ0)] + [ηCi(τ1)Ti(τ1) − ηCi(τ0)Ti(τ0)]
In the following, let’s deﬁne ∆Ci(τ0,τ1) = Qai(τ1|Ci)−Qai(τ0|Ci) Let’s assume that there are two
cohorts, C = 1 and C = 2. The former is not treated for τ0 and τ1, but the latter is treated for τ1
but not for τ0. As a consequence:
∆C=2(τ0,τ1) − ∆C=1(τ0,τ1) = [γC=2(τ1) − γC=2(τ0)] − [γC=1(τ1) − γC=1(τ0)] + ηC=2(τ1)
Therefore, ηC=2(τ1) is identiﬁed if [γC=2(τ1)−γC=2(τ0)] = [γC=1(τ1)−γC=1(τ0)]. So it is identiﬁed
if γC(τ) is constant across cohorts, which is a strong assumption. But it is not identiﬁed under an
assumption of linearity such as γCi(τ) = γ(τ) ∗ Ci. Because in that case:
∆C=2(τ0,τ1) − ∆C=1(τ0,τ1) = γ(τ1) − γ(τ0) + ηC=1(τ1)
As a consequence, ηC=2(τ1) is identiﬁed by diﬀerence in diﬀerence in diﬀerence, considering a
third cohort C = 0 which is not treated both at τ1 and at τ0. It comes:
[∆C=2(τ0,τ1) − ∆C=1(τ0,τ1)] − [∆C=1(τ0,τ1) − ∆C=0(τ0,τ1)]
= [γ(τ1) − γ(τ0) + ηC=1(τ1)] − [γ(τ1) − γ(τ0)]
= ηC=1(τ1)
This method requires untreated cohorts and cohorts only treated for τ1.
Comparing the treated cohort at τ1 (C = 2) to a cohort C = 3 which is treated both at τ0 and τ1
gives an estimation of:









































1In that case, comparing to a third cohort which is not treated both in τ1 and τ0 leads to the
identiﬁcation of ηC=2(τ1) − ηC=3(τ1) + ηC=3(τ0) but neither the QTE at τ0, ηC=3(τ0) nor the QTEs
at τ1.
If the QTE at τ1 is assumed to be linear in the cohort: ηC(τ) = η0(τ) + η1(τ)C, ηC=2(τ1) −
ηC=3(τ1) = η1(τ1), which is identiﬁed by the comparison of untreated cohorts to a cohort treated only
in τ1.
As a consequence, under the assumption that the QTE is linear and considering a continuum of
cohorts such that T(τ0) and T(τ1) are not always equal, the QTE is identiﬁed in the model:
∆Ci(τ0,τ1) = a(τ0,τ1) + d(τ0,τ1)Ci + [η0(τ1) + η1(τ1)Ci]Ti(τ1) + [η0(τ0) + η1(τ0)Ci]Ti(τ0) (4)
As for the diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimation, the trend in the QTE takes into account the evolution
of the composition of the unmarried population. The schema 16 illustrates the identiﬁcation.
The identiﬁcation relies heavily on the assumption of continuity: the pacs was not created, the
interquantile distance d(τ0,τ1) would have evolved the same way.
T(τ0) is not necessarily equal to T(τ1). Of course, T(τ0) implies T(τ1) because if the cohort is
treated for a low quantile, it is also treated for a higher quantile. But the contrary is not necessarily
true, especially because the pacs was created at a given period, aﬀecting all cohorts at diﬀerent ages.
However, if the compared quantiles are very close, T(τ0) ≈ T(τ1) challenging the estimation.
The estimation of the interquantile distance requires the joint estimation of two quantiles. The
variance of the estimator requires the estimation of the variance of the estimator for each quantiles
and the covariance. Therefore, the variance is estimated by bootstrap.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Evolution of quantiles
The evolution of quantiles is given by ﬁg. 19 and 20 for women and ﬁg. 17 and 18 for men. The
evolution is similar for both men and women. All quantiles are stable for the cohorts born in the
1950s. The last quantiles (higher than q40) increase for older cohorts born in the 1950s, while the
lower quantiles remain stable. Lower quantiles start increasing for cohorts born in the 1960s. It tends
to show that social changes do not aﬀect all the population at the same. While part of the population
keeps marrying with the same pattern, another part of the population changes its marital behavior.









































1increased across cohorts. This delay can be observed at all ranks of the distribution: even the lowest
quantile increased with cohort. But the quantiles also denote the increasing variance in the age of
marriage, meaning that the social norms around marriage are diluting. Highest quantiles increase
sharply with cohorts, denoting the increasing number of foregone marriages.
No disruption in the evolution of quantile can be observed after the creation of the pacs, except
that lower quantiles tend to increase at a lower rate.
The interquantile distance compares the evolution of quantiles τ1 to a baseline quantile τ0. It
means that it compares, for a given cohort, the marital behavior of the population getting married
early to those getting married older. An increasing distance between quantiles indicates the behavior
toward marriage is not changing at the same rate for diﬀerent population. Interquantile distances
are presented in ﬁg. 22 for women and in ﬁg. 21 for men. I take as baseline quantiles Q5, Q10
and Q20. The labels T1 (resp. T0) indicates that the higher τ1 (resp. lower τ0) compared quantile
was deﬁned after the creation of pacs. What ever the baseline quantile, the interquantile distance
increases over time, especially for cohorts born after 1960. The slope is larger for higher quantiles,
denoting the increasing variance of the age at ﬁrst marriage across cohorts. The distance between Q5
and Q10 is very stable across cohorts. As a consequence, the interquantile distance of other quantiles
to Q10 is very similar to the distance to Q5. Although any clear change can not be detected after the
introduction of pacs for men, the interquantile distance between highest quantiles and Q10 or Q20 is
increasing at a higher rate after the introduction of pacs for women.
5.4.2 Before-After model: quantile regressions
I propose diﬀerent speciﬁcations to estimate eq.3. The ﬁrst one only includes a constant and a trend
for cohort. The second introduces a dummy for the treatment of the creation of the pacs as deﬁned
in eq.1 and a trend for cohort after the creation of pacs, to take into account the change in the
composition of the unmarried population. I also test an alternative deﬁnition of the treatment, that
deﬁnes as treated a cohort for which the quantile was deﬁned after 2005 and not 2000. This is to
take into account the spread of information on the pacs across cohorts and the large increase in the
number of pacs contracted after 2005 because of the reform of income taxation of pacsed couples. I
then run the same estimation by adding a quadratic trend on cohorts. The same speciﬁcations are
run on two set of cohorts: the ﬁrst one only includes cohorts born after 1960, the second one adds
1955-1960 cohorts. The impact of the creation of pacs is evaluated at 12 ranks of the distribution of









































1and Q50, for the ﬁrst set of cohorts. Indeed, as indicated above, the increase started for cohorts born
after 1960 for lowest quantiles. Complete results are available in a separate appendix.
The treatment status of cohorts depends on the studied quantile: table 3 for men and table 2 for
women give the treatment status for each cohort depending on the quantile. Tables 4 to 9 gives the
results of the quantile regressions. The coeﬃcient on cohort is stable across speciﬁcations. Adding
a quadratic trend seems relevant as it is signiﬁcant in many speciﬁcations. The treatment status
is signiﬁcant for lower quantiles but not for higher quantiles. Surprisingly, the treatment status is
negative for lower quantile, meaning that under the assumption of constant trend across cohort,
the treatment tend to lower the age at marriage for those getting married early. This eﬀect seems
surprising as it is unexpected. However, the total impact of the treatment has to be computed in
order to discuss the impact of the creation of the pacs. The second deﬁnition of treatment is not
signiﬁcant. As a consequence, any changes in the timing of marriage have to be detected before 2005.
My favorite speciﬁcation includes a trend and a quadratic trend in cohort, a dummy for treatment in
2000 and a trend for treated cohorts (column (6))
The coeﬃcients of the quantile regressions are plotted in ﬁgure 24 for men and ﬁgure 23 for
women. Not surprisingly, the coeﬃcients on cohort are increasing over quantiles, meaning higher
quantiles tend to vary more with cohort than lower quantiles. The quadratic trend is signiﬁcant
for intermediate quantiles, although it is slightly signiﬁcant for men. The coeﬃcients on treatment
show interesting pattern. The dummy for treated cohort positive and signiﬁcant, while the trend for
cohort after the treatment is negative for lower quantiles. The intermediate quantiles, the signs are
the contrary.
The total impact of treatment for a given cohort can be reconstructed at each rank of the distri-
bution with:
ˆ η(τ) = ˆ η1(τ) ∗ cohort + ˆ η0(τ)
Fig. 27 for women and 28 for men reconstruct the impact of treatment for two cohorts. The cohort
of females born in 1975 is aﬀected after the 20th percentile. The impact of pacs is not signiﬁcant on
the distribution of the age at marriage. However, the cohort born in 1977 is aﬀected since the 10th
percentile. Lowest quantiles are negatively aﬀected: the age such as 10% of the 1977 cohort is married
is 5 months lower than what it would have been without pacs. This result can be interpreted as a sign
that the youngest cohort are aﬀected negatively by the creation of pacs, meaning that they tend to
marry younger than what they would have done the pacs was not created. It can also be interpreted









































1of the distribution would have increased slower after 2000. This is the most likely interpretation,
although the reason of the slow down for lowest quantiles is not clear. For men, the measured impact
of pacs is never signiﬁcant.
5.4.3 DiD model: interquantile regressions
The interquantile estimation are based on the idea that the baseline quantile estimated at rank τ0
is similar to a control group, so the assumption is that distance between the treated group (ie the
upper quantile, estimated at rank τ1) would have evolved the same way as before the creation of the
pacs. I observed in the previous part that the lower quantiles tend to increase at a smaller rate after
the pacs is created. So the interquantile regression makes the implicit assumption that quantiles are
jointly determined and that the upper quantiles estimated at rank τ1 would have also increased at a
lower rate. Interquantile regressions drop features of the distribution common to diﬀerent quantiles. I
take diﬀerent baselines quantiles: Q5, Q10 and Q20. But the comparison of close quantiles suﬀers an
identiﬁcation problem, because for close quantiles, cohort treated for at the rank of the distribution
τ1 is almost the same as the treatment status at the rank of the distribution τ0. As a consequence,
I test diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst includes a trend on cohort, the second adds a dummy and a
trend for on the cohort for the treatment status of the cohort at the rank τ1. The third adds a dummy
and a trend on cohort for treatment status at the rank τ0. The last three columns add a quadratic
trend on cohort. I also test two set of cohorts: cohorts born after 1960 and cohorts born after 1955
(only results on cohort born after 1960 are presented).
I present only a few interquantile regressions, for selected ranks in tables 10 to 21. The coeﬃcient
on cohort is stable and signiﬁcant, while the quadratic trend is signiﬁcant for the comparison of the
lowest quantiles (Q5-Q10, Q5-Q20, Q10-Q20). When the treatment status of the quantile estimated
at τ0 is not included, the coeﬃcient for the treatment status of the cohort for the quantile estimated at
τ1 is signiﬁcant when comparing the lowest quantile (Q10), indicating that the interquantile distance
tend to increase across cohorts after the creation of the pacs. But the treatment status is not signiﬁcant
for the comparison with higher quantile (Q50). This could be due to the fact that the comparison
with high quantile reduces drastically the number of cohorts included in the regression, as the high
quantile are only deﬁned for older cohorts, but also because older cohort are less aﬀected by the
pacs. As noted above, the treatment status of the cohort for the quantile estimated in τ0 is very
close to the treatment status of the cohort for the quantile estimated at τ1. As a consequence,
including the treatment status in the regression increases the standard error and the estimations are









































1treatment status for the quantile computed in τ1 but not for the quantile computed in τ0. Dropping
the treatment status for the quantile computed in τ0 tend to bias the estimation. Indeed, if the
quantile at τ0 tends to increase because of treatment, and if this increase is not taken into account
then I tend to overestimate the treatment eﬀect, providing that the impact is positive and signiﬁcant
on the lower compared quantile, or to underestimate the treatment eﬀect if the impact is negative.
The estimation in the previous part tend to show that the evolution is either negative (Q5) or not
signiﬁcant so it tends to underestimate the impact. Moreover, notice that lower quantiles tend to
take more time to react to social changes: while the highest quantile of the distribution of the age
at marriage grew very fast for cohorts born in the 1950s, the lowest quantiles started increasing for
cohorts born in the 1960s. Maybe this is due to the fact that population likely to marry early might
have a higher taste for marriage. As a consequence, it might be possible to observe some distortions in
the interquantile distance if the adjustment is not as fast for lower quantiles than for higher quantiles.
This distortion could indicates an impact of the creation of pacs on the age at ﬁrst marriage. Notice
that if the conditions are veriﬁed, the results for the treatment eﬀect should be the same, independent
of the baseline.
Fig. 25 and 26 gives the impact of coeﬃcients at each rank of the distribution. The coeﬃcient of
cohort is increasing and signiﬁcant, indicating that the interquantile distance increases across cohorts.
The coeﬃcient on the quadratic trend is negative, so the impact of the cohort on the quantile is
concave. The parameters of interest are given by the coeﬃcient of the dummy variable on treatment
and the trend on cohorts after treatment. Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant for lower quantiles, whatever
the baseline quantile. The coeﬃcient on the dummy is negative, while the coeﬃcient of the trend
is positive. The sign of the total impact have to be derived, but the evolution across cohorts can
be directly interpreted as it is given by the trend on cohorts after the pacs. The positive coeﬃcient
indicates that it tends to increase after the pacs is created, especially for intermediate quantile,
whatever the baseline quantile. Notice that the comparison of the three baseline quantiles give
similar results.
Fig. 27 give the estimated impact of the creation of the pacs on the distribution in the age
at marriage for the female cohorts born in 1975 and 1977 and ﬁg. 28 for male cohorts born in
1973 and 1976. The impact is not signiﬁcant for older cohorts but it is signiﬁcant and positive
for intermediate quantiles for younger cohorts. It indicates that the age at marriage increased with
approximatively 10 months (depending on the baseline quantile) for the rank τ1 = 0.3, and it increased
with approximatively 15 months (depending on the baseline quantile) for the rank τ1 = 0.35 for









































1total impact of the treatment estimated by interquantile regressions is very similar to the estimation
using quantile regressions.
5.4.4 Interpretation
The results highlight two main eﬀects. First, the increase of the age at ﬁrst marriage for lower
percentiles has slowed down after the creation of the pacs. However, the causal interpretation of the
impact of the creation of pacs relies on strong assumptions: any social changes occurring at the same
time is interpreted as an impact of the creation of the pacs. So this result could also be understood
as a sign that the conditional quantile functions would have slow down, and it is detected on lower
quantile because people likely to marry early do not adapt their marital behavior to the creation of
the pacs. So lower quantiles could be interpreted as baseline quantiles: in that case, the assumption
that quantiles of the CDF are jointly determines implies that the increase of higher quantiles would
have also slowed down. As a consequence, the interquantile regressions indicates that people getting
married older (intermediate quantiles) have delayed their marriage, leading to an increase of the
quantile. But this interpretation relies also on strong parametric assumptions on the interquantile
distance. Notice that a decline in the quantiles deﬁned at higher ranks is not observed: so the increase
in the quantiles at intermediate ranks does not reveal a delay because a pure delay should be detected
with the estimation that the treatment increases quantiles for some ranks while it deceases for higher
ranks.
So, if any, the impact of the creation of the pacs on the marital behavior of couples is not clear,
meaning that the impact might be quite small. So it might mean that the pacs is contracted either
by couples that would not get married anyway or during the cohabitation spell. Therefore, it reveals
a demand for diﬀerent marital contracts during the pre-marital period and an evolution over the life










































The paper attempts to analyze if the pacs is used as a substitute to marriage. The analysis is based
on the idea that if the pacs is a substitute to marriage then it should change the timing of marriage
either because the couple do not get married or because they get married later. The problem is that
timing eﬀects are diﬃcult to measure on period data because classical indicators are not neutral to
the tempo marriage. But a cohort analysis requires to wait for a long time before data on the age at
ﬁrst marriage are available for the complete cohort. However, the change in the timing of marriage
can be observed in the cumulative distribution function of the age at marriage. Therefore, the idea is
to check if the pacs has an impact on the timing of marriage by analyzing if the features of the CDF
of the age at ﬁrst marriage, by cohort. So I propose to analyse the quantiles of the distribution of the
age at marriage in order to detect changes in the timing of marriage after the creation of the pacs. I
ﬁnd a slightly signiﬁcant change in the timing of marriage after the creation of pacs for intermediate
quantile (Q25-Q30 for men, Q30-Q35 for women), for young cohorts (born after 1975 for women,
1973 for men). This change might be explained by the creation of pacs. As a consequence, if any, the
impact of the creation of pacs on the timing of marriage is not very important.
This paper is still an on-going project that has to be completed with Enquête Famille 2011, a
survey joint to the census. It will provide micro data and information on the household formation,
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1A Legal features of pacs and marriage
Table 1: Legal features of marital status in France
Cohabitation Pacs Marriage
Income taxation Separate
• Before 2005: separate
during 3 years, com-
mon after
• After 2005: common
since the day the pacs
is contracted
Common since the day the
marriage is contracted
Inheritance
• Surviving partner has
to be declared in the
testimony
• High tax rates: after a
1564eur allowance, tax
rate of 60%
• Surviving partner has
to be declared in the
testimony
• Since 2007: No tax
• Before 2007: marginal
tax rate of 40% until
15000eur, 50% after
• Surviving partner auto-
matically inherits from
the spouse
• Since 2007: No tax
• Before 2007: Taxed,
but lower rates than
pacsed partners
Assets sharing No asset sharing, unless
bought together
• Since 2006: By de-
fault, the contract sep-
arates assets. But the
type of contracts can be
changed.
• Before 2006: Depends
on the contract when
the pacs is contracted.
By default, the contract sepa-
rate assets bought before the
marriage, but assets bought af-
ter the marriage are common
(communauté de biens réduite
aux acquêts). But the type of
contracts can be changed (for
separate or community of all
assets.
Debts No solidarity Solidarity of debts linked to ev-
eryday life and housing
Solidarity of debts (but protec-
tion of the housing)
Adoption No legal adoption by the part-
ners (but one can adopt on its
own)
No legal adoption by the part-
ners (but one can adopt on its
own)
Legal adoption authorized
Social protection No common coverage Common coverage allowed Common coverage allowed
Survivor’s pension No No Yes
Citizenship No citizenship No citizenship, but being
pacsed can be a relevant piece
Citizenship after 4 years
Break up Unilateral or common. No
cost, but no alimony nor dam-
ages pension
Unilateral or common. No
great costs: letter to the court.
But no alimony, possibility of
damages pension
Common. Divorce costs (obli-
gation to be dissolved by a
judge). Possibility of alimonies
and damages pension























































































Number of pacs and marriages in France (1965−2009)




































2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
year
Marriages
Marrriages+pacs (different sex couples)
Marriages+pacs
Number of pacs and marriages in France (2000−2009)








































































































































































































































































Age structure of population, 1965−2009
17−24 25−29 30−39 40−60
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year
M(t)=R(t)Pop(t) R(0)Pop(t) R(t)Pop(0)









































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
M(t)=R(t)Pop(t) R(0)Pop(t) R(t)Pop(0)
Evolution of first marriages (Men)













































































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Haz. rate marriage women Haz. rate union women
Haz. rate marriage Men Haz. rate union Men
Hazard rates for first marriage and unions









1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Men − first marriage Women − first marriage
Men − all marriage Women − all marriage
Total Marriage Rates, men and women








































































Total Marriage Rates by age group, men
















































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
women men pacs men pacs women
Data on pacs: before 2006: infostat justice n°97, octobre 2007
After 2007: ministry of justice + reconstruct under the assumption that the gap
between men and women remains equal to 2 years
Age at first marriage and pacs (17−65 y.)







1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Evolution of pop Evolution of rates Total
Decomposition of the evolution of the age at first marriage





1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
Evolution of pop Evolution of rates Total
Decomposition of the evolution of the age at first marriage
Ref: 1968 − Women














































1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
<24 [24,29] [30,39] >39 Tot
Decomposition of the age at first marriage: population
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year
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Decomposition of the age at first marriage: rates
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1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
<24 [24,29] [30,39] >39 Tot
Decomposition of the age at first marriage: rates
Ref: 1968 − Women








































































Vertical lines indicate cohorts included in regression
Size of the cohort






















































































Density of the age at 1st marriage










































CDF of the age at 1st marriage


















































Hazard of the age at 1st marriage
Selected cohorts − men


































































Density of the age at 1st marriage












































CDF of the age at 1st marriage

































Hazard of the age at 1st marriage
Selected cohorts − women





















































10 20 30 40 50
C0: Untreated cohort C1: Treated cohort for tau>0.2
Treatment Status





10 20 30 40 50
C0, C1: Untreated cohorts C2: Treated cohort for tau>0.2
Difference on quantiles





















































C2, C3: Treated cohorts C0, C1: Untreated cohort
Difference on interquantile distance











































































1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Birth Cohort
q20, q40 and q60 are in red for lecture
Quantiles of the age at first marriage (q5−q75)
Men


































































1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Birth Cohort
The quantile at right of the red line are determined after the pacs was created





























1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Birth Cohort
The quantile at right of the red line are determined after the pacs was created

































1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Birth Cohort
The quantile at right of the red line are determined after the pacs was created
Quantiles of the age at first marriage (q55−q75)
Men



































































1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Birth Cohort
q20, q40 and q60 are in red for lecture
Quantiles of the age at first marriage (q5−q75)
Women




























































1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Birth Cohort
The quantile at right of the red line are determined after the pacs was created
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Birth Cohort
The quantile at right of the red line are determined after the pacs was created



























1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Birth Cohort
The quantile at right of the red line are determined after the pacs was created
Quantiles of the age at first marriage (q55−q75)
Women




















































































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Birth cohort
Q20−Q5 and Q35−Q5 are in red
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Birth cohort
Q25−Q10 and Q40−Q10 are in red











































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Birth cohort
Q35−Q20 is in red
Interquantile distance to Q20
Men
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Birth cohort
Q35−Q20 is in red
Interquantile distance to Q20
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Cohort*treated coefficients − Women
quantile regressions
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Table 2: Treatment status of cohorts depending on the quantile - Women
cohort First Last in 2000 in 2005 q5 q10 q15 q20 q25 q30 q35 q40 q45 q50 q55 q60
1955 0 0.86 0.85 0.86 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1956 0 0.85 0.84 0.85 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1957 0 0.84 0.82 0.83 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1958 0 0.83 0.81 0.82 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1959 0 0.82 0.79 0.81 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1960 0 0.80 0.77 0.79 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1961 0 0.79 0.76 0.78 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1962 0 0.77 0.73 0.75 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1963 0 0.76 0.71 0.74 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1964 0 0.74 0.69 0.72 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1965 0 0.72 0.66 0.70 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1966 0 0.70 0.63 0.68 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1967 0 0.69 0.60 0.66 U U U U U U U U U U U T
1968 0 0.67 0.57 0.63 U U U U U U U U U U U T
1969 0 0.65 0.53 0.61 U U U U U U U U U U T T
1970 0 0.63 0.49 0.59 U U U U U U U U U T T T
1971 0 0.62 0.44 0.57 U U U U U U U U T T T T
1972 0 0.60 0.39 0.54 U U U U U U U T T T T
1973 0 0.57 0.32 0.50 U U U U U U T T T T T
1974 0 0.54 0.25 0.46 U U U U T T T T T T
1975 0 0.51 0.18 0.41 U U U T T T T T T T
1976 0 0.47 0.12 0.36 U U T T T T T T T
1977 0 0.45 0.08 0.31 U T T T T T T T
1978 0 0.40 0.04 0.24 T T T T T T T
1979 0 0.36 0 0.19 T T T T T T T
1980 0 0.33 0 0.14 T T T T T T
1981 0 0.28 0 0.10 T T T T T
1982 0 0.23 0 0.06 T T T T
1983 0 0.17 0 0.04 T T T
1984 0 0.13 0 0 T T
1985 0 0.09 0 0 T
1986 0 0.06 0 0 T









































1Table 3: Treatment status of cohorts depending on the quantile - Men
cohort First Last in 2000 in 2005 q5 q10 q15 q20 q25 q30 q35 q40 q45 q50 q55 q60
1955 0 0.83 0.82 0.83 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1956 0 0.82 0.80 0.81 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1957 0 0.81 0.78 0.80 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1958 0 0.79 0.76 0.78 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1959 0 0.77 0.74 0.76 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1960 0 0.76 0.72 0.74 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1961 0 0.74 0.69 0.72 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1962 0 0.72 0.66 0.70 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1963 0 0.71 0.64 0.68 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1964 0 0.69 0.62 0.67 U U U U U U U U U U U U
1965 0 0.67 0.58 0.64 U U U U U U U U U U U T
1966 0 0.64 0.54 0.61 U U U U U U U U U U T T
1967 0 0.63 0.51 0.59 U U U U U U U U U U T T
1968 0 0.61 0.47 0.56 U U U U U U U U U T T T
1969 0 0.59 0.42 0.53 U U U U U U U U T T T
1970 0 0.57 0.37 0.51 U U U U U U U T T T T
1971 0 0.55 0.31 0.47 U U U U U U T T T T
1972 0 0.52 0.25 0.44 U U U U U T T T T T
1973 0 0.50 0.19 0.40 U U U T T T T T T T
1974 0 0.46 0.13 0.35 U U T T T T T T T
1975 0 0.41 0.07 0.29 U T T T T T T T
1976 0 0.37 0.04 0.23 T T T T T T T
1977 0 0.34 0.02 0.18 T T T T T T
1978 0 0.30 0.01 0.13 T T T T T
1979 0 0.25 0 0.09 T T T T T
1980 0 0.22 0 0.06 T T T T
1981 0 0.17 0 0.03 T T T
1982 0 0.13 0 0.02 T T
1983 0 0.08 0 0.01 T
1984 0 0.06 0 0 T
1985 0 0.03 0 0
1986 0 0.02 0 0









































1F.2 Before-After estimation on quantiles
F.2.1 Women
Table 4: Women - quantile Q5 - cohorts 1960-1986
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cohort 2.455∗∗∗ 3.000∗∗∗ 2.667∗∗∗ 3.000∗∗∗ 3.912∗∗∗ 3.000∗∗∗ 3.914∗∗∗ 3.000∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.075) (0.041) (0.063) (0.129) (0.246) (0.167) (0.206)
T2000 25.333∗∗∗ 38.333∗∗ 25.333∗∗ 38.333∗∗
(5.762) (11.903) (7.985) (12.923)
cohort*T2000 -1.667∗∗∗ -2.333∗∗∗ -1.667∗∗∗ -2.333∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.607) (0.464) (0.674)
T2005 19.833 -16.833 -9.272 -16.833
(24.735) (28.187) (25.844) (28.252)
cohort*T2005 -1.167 0.833 0.372 0.833
(1.004) (1.223) (1.063) (1.237)
cohort2 -0.058∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.058∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.005) (0.015) (0.008) (0.012)
Constant 219.091∗∗∗ 216.000∗∗∗ 217.667∗∗∗ 216.000∗∗∗ 213.407∗∗∗ 216.000∗∗∗ 213.405∗∗∗ 216.000∗∗∗
(0.513) (0.560) (0.417) (0.560) (0.609) (0.758) (0.668) (0.797)
Observations 99010 99010 99010 99010 99010 99010 99010 99010
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts: 1978 1986
Table 5: Women - quantile Q20 - cohorts 1960-1982
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cohort 3.867∗∗∗ 4.667∗∗∗ 4.214∗∗∗ 4.667∗∗∗ 5.992∗∗∗ 5.263∗∗∗ 6.188∗∗∗ 5.267∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.071) (0.065) (0.072) (0.175) (0.330) (0.233) (0.342)
T2000 26.833∗∗∗ 26.833∗ 14.614 17.100
(4.089) (12.801) (8.201) (9.900)
cohort*T2000 -2.167∗∗∗ -2.167∗∗ -1.244∗ -1.409∗
(0.248) (0.776) (0.576) (0.652)
T2005 21.190 -3.167 -18.448 -10.082
(17.798) (24.114) (16.266) (19.888)
cohort*T2005 -1.548 0.167 0.964 0.548
(0.888) (1.274) (0.823) (1.049)
cohort2 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.042 -0.109∗∗∗ -0.042
(0.008) (0.022) (0.013) (0.023)
Constant 243.267∗∗∗ 238.667∗∗∗ 241.143∗∗∗ 238.667∗∗∗ 235.917∗∗∗ 237.591∗∗∗ 235.062∗∗∗ 237.582∗∗∗
(0.543) (0.548) (0.616) (0.637) (0.783) (0.991) (0.703) (0.996)
Observations 84319 84319 84319 84319 84319 84319 84319 84319
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001









































1Table 6: Women - quantile Q50 - cohorts 1960-1975
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cohort 7.500∗∗∗ 8.000∗∗∗ 7.333∗∗∗ 8.000∗∗∗ 7.889∗∗∗ 8.000∗∗∗ 9.475∗∗∗ 9.271∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.304) (0.199) (0.349) (0.734) (1.334) (0.830) (1.492)
T2000 -14.500 10.000 -14.500 -3.400
(14.484) (20.998) (21.135) (25.896)
cohort*T2000 0.750 -1.500 0.750 0.057
(1.268) (1.864) (2.343) (2.659)
T2005 -75.667 -83.000 -104.825 -94.571
(5048.984) (4917.422) (4641.830) (4646.469)
cohort*T2005 5.667 6.500 8.237 7.400
(360.614) (351.160) (331.597) (331.868)
cohort2 -0.028 -0.000 -0.162∗∗ -0.129
(0.052) (0.143) (0.062) (0.148)
Constant 289.000∗∗∗ 287.000∗∗∗ 289.667∗∗∗ 287.000∗∗∗ 288.139∗∗∗ 287.000∗∗∗ 284.700∗∗∗ 284.971∗∗∗
(1.386) (1.569) (1.241) (1.356) (2.090) (2.576) (2.271) (3.210)
Observations 59267 59267 59267 59267 59267 59267 59267 59267
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts: 1970 1975
F.2.2 Men
Table 7: Men - quantile Q5 - cohorts 1960-1984
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cohort 2.500∗∗∗ 3.000∗∗∗ 2.727∗∗∗ 3.000∗∗∗ 3.833∗∗∗ 3.000∗∗∗ 3.775∗∗∗ 3.000∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.055) (0.053) (0.083) (0.159) (0.273) (0.196) (0.288)
T2000 22.000∗∗∗ 24.667∗ 22.000∗ 24.667∗
(4.964) (10.322) (9.095) (11.213)
cohort*T2000 -1.500∗∗∗ -1.667∗∗ -1.500∗∗ -1.667∗
(0.256) (0.584) (0.555) (0.656)
T2005 16.454 -6.667 -6.491 -6.667
(19.646) (22.788) (22.721) (22.220)
cohort*T2005 -1.061 0.333 0.244 0.333
(0.885) (1.080) (1.037) (1.036)
cohort2 -0.056∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.052∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.007) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018)
Constant 248.000∗∗∗ 245.000∗∗∗ 246.545∗∗∗ 245.000∗∗∗ 243.000∗∗∗ 245.000∗∗∗ 243.145∗∗∗ 245.000∗∗∗
(0.490) (0.407) (0.508) (0.650) (0.731) (0.849) (0.786) (0.821)
Observations 90957 90957 90957 90957 90957 90957 90957 90957
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001









































1Table 8: Men - quantile Q20 - cohorts 1960-1980
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cohort 3.889∗∗∗ 4.429∗∗∗ 4.000∗∗∗ 4.429∗∗∗ 5.125∗∗∗ 5.700∗∗∗ 5.545∗∗∗ 5.583∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.119) (0.083) (0.110) (0.260) (0.511) (0.269) (0.493)
T2000 4.952 -6.714 -18.000 -24.733
(4.385) (9.601) (9.862) (14.666)
cohort*T2000 -0.762∗∗ 0.071 1.200 1.667
(0.290) (0.704) (0.824) (1.093)
T2005 15.000 24.000 -14.818 9.700
(16.852) (22.234) (18.496) (21.372)
cohort*T2005 -1.000 -1.500 1.000 -0.675
(0.928) (1.281) (1.046) (1.253)
cohort2 -0.062∗∗∗ -0.100∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.092∗
(0.014) (0.040) (0.017) (0.036)
Constant 275.444∗∗∗ 272.714∗∗∗ 275.000∗∗∗ 272.714∗∗∗ 271.188∗∗∗ 270.000∗∗∗ 270.273∗∗∗ 270.200∗∗∗
(0.657) (0.818) (0.786) (0.796) (0.985) (1.196) (0.895) (1.300)
Observations 76182 76182 76182 76182 76182 76182 76182 76182
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts: 1973 1980
Table 9: Men - quantile Q50 - cohorts 1960-1973
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
cohort 8.222∗∗∗ 8.500∗∗∗ 8.250∗∗∗ 8.500∗∗∗ 8.655∗∗∗ 8.500∗∗ 9.300∗∗∗ 9.333∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.511) (0.410) (0.504) (1.419) (3.112) (1.479) (2.567)
T2000 2.500 2.500 2.500 -3.250
(21.220) (35.508) (31.287) (33.030)
cohort*T2000 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 0.250
(2.297) (4.058) (4.381) (4.348)
T2005 -3.750 -5.500 -15.800 -9.917
(826.083) (1467.304) (1474.448) (1021.137)
cohort*T2005 0.250 0.500 1.600 0.917
(75.087) (133.291) (133.874) (92.831)
cohort2 -0.036 0.000 -0.100 -0.083
(0.118) (0.395) (0.156) (0.344)
Constant 333.333∗∗∗ 332.500∗∗∗ 333.250∗∗∗ 332.500∗∗∗ 332.382∗∗∗ 332.500∗∗∗ 331.000∗∗∗ 330.750∗∗∗
(2.159) (1.755) (2.055) (2.083) (3.371) (4.787) (3.167) (4.090)
Observations 51452 51452 51452 51452 51452 51452 51452 51452
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001









































1F.3 DiD estimation on interquantile distances
F.3.1 Women
Table 10: Women - interquantile Q5-Q10 - cohorts 1960-1984
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cohort 0.476∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.053) (0.059) (0.129) (0.131) (0.123)
T2000(q10) -5.161 -10.287∗
(4.128) (4.434)
cohort*T2000(q10) 0.152 -0.226∗∗ 0.541∗ -0.179∗





cohort2 -0.012 -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 11.119∗∗∗ 10.411∗∗∗ 10.411∗∗∗ 10.500∗∗∗ 10.005∗∗∗ 10.005∗∗∗
(0.353) (0.427) (0.528) (0.491) (0.475) (0.480)
Observations 87528 87528 87528 87528 87528 87528
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts for q5: 1978 1984; for q10: 1977 1984
Table 11: Women - interquantile Q5-Q20 - cohorts 1960-1982
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cohort 1.253∗∗∗ 1.600∗∗∗ 1.600∗∗∗ 2.083∗∗∗ 2.683∗∗∗ 2.699∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.067) (0.073) (0.145) (0.256) (0.281)
T2000(q20) -5.900 2.600 -31.267∗∗∗ -15.972
(5.130) (16.571) (7.838) (19.852)
cohort*T2000(q20) -0.100 -0.600 1.903∗∗ 0.951





cohort2 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.022) (0.021)
Constant 25.000∗∗∗ 23.400∗∗∗ 23.400∗∗∗ 22.458∗∗∗ 21.296∗∗∗ 21.281∗∗∗
(0.509) (0.493) (0.560) (0.583) (0.602) (0.740)
Observations 88349 88349 88349 88349 88349 88349
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001









































1Table 12: Women - interquantile Q5-Q50 - cohorts 1960-1975
(1) (2) (4) (5)
cohort 4.571∗∗∗ 5.250∗∗∗ 5.837∗∗∗ 6.429∗∗∗







Constant 72.429∗∗∗ 70.000∗∗∗ 70.000∗∗∗ 68.714∗∗∗
(0.994) (1.188) (1.127) (1.411)
Observations 63297 63297 63297 63297
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts for q5: none; for q50: 1970 1975
Table 13: Women - interquantile Q10-Q20 - cohorts 1960-1982
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cohort 0.689∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 1.880∗∗∗ 1.820∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.061) (0.063) (0.130) (0.224) (0.248)
T2000(q20) -7.471 -6.400 -28.313∗∗∗ -21.924
(4.221) (26.163) (5.603) (30.894)
cohort*T2000(q20) 0.221 0.150 1.854∗∗∗ 1.422





cohort2 -0.019∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.016) (0.018)
Constant 15.400∗∗∗ 14.400∗∗∗ 14.400∗∗∗ 14.000∗∗∗ 12.396∗∗∗ 12.567∗∗∗
(0.381) (0.377) (0.373) (0.496) (0.585) (0.630)
Observations 88349 88349 88349 88349 88349 88349
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001









































1Table 14: Women - interquantile Q10-Q50 - cohorts 1960-1975
(1) (2) (4) (5)
cohort 3.844∗∗∗ 4.500∗∗∗ 4.773∗∗∗ 5.833∗∗∗







Constant 63.338∗∗∗ 61.000∗∗∗ 61.905∗∗∗ 60.000∗∗∗
(1.001) (1.117) (1.158) (1.239)
Observations 63297 63297 63297 63297
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts for q10: none; for q50: 1970 1975
Table 15: Women - interquantile Q20-Q50 - cohorts 1960-1975
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cohort 3.071∗∗∗ 3.375∗∗∗ 3.375∗∗∗ 2.988∗∗∗ 3.933∗∗∗ 4.433∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.241) (0.219) (0.521) (0.759) (0.640)
T2000(q50) -27.625∗ -14.792 -38.000∗ -33.183
(12.693) (12.743) (16.337) (16.964)
cohort*T2000(q50) 1.875 0.708 3.050 2.817
(1.100) (1.128) (1.695) (1.691)
T2000(q20) 0.728 0.766
(18.461) (24.473)
cohort2 0.001 -0.067 -0.129
(0.042) (0.086) (0.072)
Constant 48.429∗∗∗ 47.625∗∗∗ 47.625∗∗∗ 49.000∗∗∗ 47.000∗∗∗ 47.000∗∗∗
(0.973) (1.146) (1.036) (1.248) (1.346) (1.278)
Observations 63297 63297 63297 63297 63297 63297
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001










































Table 16: Men - interquantile Q5-Q10 - cohorts 1960-1982
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cohort 0.476∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.053) (0.059) (0.129) (0.131) (0.123)
T2000(q10) -5.161 -10.287∗
(4.128) (4.434)
cohort*T2000(q10) 0.152 -0.226∗∗ 0.541∗ -0.179∗





cohort2 -0.012 -0.018∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 11.119∗∗∗ 10.411∗∗∗ 10.411∗∗∗ 10.500∗∗∗ 10.005∗∗∗ 10.005∗∗∗
(0.353) (0.427) (0.528) (0.491) (0.475) (0.480)
Observations 87528 87528 87528 87528 87528 87528
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts for q5: 1976 1982; for q10: 1975 1982
Table 17: Men - interquantile Q5-Q20 - cohorts 1960-1980
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cohort 1.195∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗ 1.524∗∗∗ 2.810∗∗∗ 2.876∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.115) (0.093) (0.193) (0.354) (0.387)
T2000(q20) -11.479∗∗ 14.455 -38.393∗∗∗ -9.321
(3.927) (16.785) (7.836) (20.046)
cohort*T2000(q20) 0.412 -1.455 2.845∗∗∗ 0.807





cohort2 -0.018 -0.119∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.029) (0.032)
Constant 28.467∗∗∗ 27.545∗∗∗ 27.545∗∗∗ 27.312∗∗∗ 25.000∗∗∗ 25.000∗∗∗
(0.634) (0.687) (0.642) (0.754) (0.851) (0.847)
Observations 80149 80149 80149 80149 80149 80149
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001









































1Table 18: Men - interquantile Q5-Q50 - cohorts 1960-1973
(1) (2) (4) (5)
cohort 5.273∗∗∗ 5.500∗∗∗ 5.992∗∗∗ 6.438∗∗∗







Constant 88.000∗∗∗ 87.500∗∗∗ 86.333∗∗∗ 86.000∗∗∗
(1.447) (1.757) (1.758) (2.311)
Observations 55426 55426 55426 55426
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts for q5: none; for q50: 1968 1973
Table 19: Men - interquantile Q10-Q20 - cohorts 1960-1980
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cohort 0.706∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗ 1.732∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.070) (0.080) (0.170) (0.250) (0.238)
T2000(q20) -12.806∗∗ 6.727 -31.353∗∗∗ -7.446
(4.666) (25.193) (6.822) (23.752)
cohort*T2000(q20) 0.739∗ -0.727 2.379∗∗∗ 0.606





cohort2 0.002 -0.080∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.021) (0.019)
Constant 17.444∗∗∗ 17.273∗∗∗ 17.273∗∗∗ 17.321∗∗∗ 15.766∗∗∗ 15.688∗∗∗
(0.402) (0.411) (0.494) (0.699) (0.606) (0.702)
Observations 80149 80149 80149 80149 80149 80149
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001









































1Table 20: Men - interquantile Q10-Q50 - cohorts 1960-1973
(1) (2) (4) (5)
cohort 4.648∗∗∗ 4.700∗∗∗ 4.738∗∗∗ 5.238∗∗







Constant 77.250∗∗∗ 77.300∗∗∗ 77.238∗∗∗ 76.542∗∗∗
(1.438) (1.424) (1.802) (2.357)
Observations 55426 55426 55426 55426
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts for q10: none; for q50: 1968 1973
Table 21: Men - interquantile Q20-Q50 - cohorts 1960-1973
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cohort 3.973∗∗∗ 3.750∗∗∗ 3.750∗∗∗ 3.086∗∗ 3.024∗ 3.405∗
(0.265) (0.368) (0.448) (1.059) (1.202) (1.505)
T2000(q50) -12.000 -5.750 1.607 0.429
(18.430) (13.902) (22.811) (24.348)
cohort*T2000(q50) 1.250 0.583 -0.607 -0.321
(1.859) (1.541) (2.919) (3.300)
T2000(q20) 0.359 0.341
(29.609) (29.729)
cohort2 0.067 0.119 0.060
(0.098) (0.179) (0.227)
Constant 59.900∗∗∗ 60.750∗∗∗ 60.750∗∗∗ 61.333∗∗∗ 61.000∗∗∗ 61.000∗∗∗
(1.219) (1.380) (1.655) (1.967) (1.559) (1.788)
Observations 55426 55426 55426 55426 55426 55426
Standard errors in parentheses. Observations × 100.
∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Treated cohorts for q20: 1973; for q50: 1968 1973
70
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
6
5
5
5
8
5
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
3
1
 
D
e
c
 
2
0
1
1